讲座主题：Robust Contracting for Sequential Search

主讲嘉宾：徐博立 爱荷华大学商学院经济系助理教授

讲座时间：2025年5月28日 周三10:00

讲座地点：腾讯会议：526-183-251

嘉宾简介：徐博立，爱荷华大学商学院经济系助理教授，2023年6月毕业于美国西北大学经济系。他的研究领域为微观经济理论和产业组织。他的论文在Theoretical Economics、RandJournal of Economics上已发表或正进行复审。

内容摘要：A principal contracts with an agent who can sequentially search over projects to generate a prize. The principal knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We characterize the set of robustly optimal contracts, all of which involve a minimum debt level, i.e., the agent only receives payment if the prize exceeds a certain threshold. This debt requirement is essential to prevent the agent from terminating the search too early. Our characterization encompasses several commonly observed contract formats, including pure debt, debt-plus-equity, and tranches. We also study situations where each of these contracts emerges as the unique prediction. In contrast to much of the existing robust contracting literature, linear contracts are strictly sub-optimal because they dampen the agent's search incentive.

本讲座由Betway必威西汉姆联第七批青年科研创新团队经费支持。